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ABSTRACT
In modern society, the cell phone has become a virtual extension of
most Americans, managing all kinds of personal and business matters.
Modern cell tower technology allows cell service providers to accumu-
late a wealth of individuals’ location information while they use their
cell phones, and such data is available for law enforcement to obtain
without a warrant. This is problematic under the Fourth Amendment,
which protects reasonable expectations of privacy. Under the Katz two-
prong test, (1) individuals have an actual, subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in their cell site location data, and (2) society is prepared to ac-
knowledge that expectation as reasonable. In addtion, I propose that
the second prong of the Katz test should be approached as a normative
inquiry. Courts should ask whether society should expect privacy in
this type of information. Currently, courts analyzing this issue have fol-
lowed Supreme Court precedent from the 1970s and 80s, using short-
cuts such as the third-party doctrine to decide the issue. This precedent
is from an era that predates modern cell phone technology, and it fails
to properly address the true privacy concerns implicated by cell site
location data. A few courts have adopted the mosaic theory approach
to the question of cell site location data. However this theory also fails
to effectively guard against unconstitutional government intrusion in
all instances. I propose that the best solution is to always require a
warrant before allowing law enforcement to access cell site location
data. This solution will provide a clear standard for courts, individuals,
law enforcement agents, and cell service providers; also, it will ensure
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that millions of innocent Americans are protected from intrusive gov-
ernment surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of cell phones in modern society has presented new
concerns for individuals’ privacy and forced courts to decide whether Fourth
Amendment protections should apply to the data that cell phones generate.
Today, using a cell phone means that cell service providers can track indi-
viduals’ physical location and store massive amounts of their location infor-
mation. The Supreme Court has not yet decided the question of how courts
should treat this data under the Fourth Amendment. Because this location
data provides law enforcement with a powerful new method of investigation,
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courts must choose whether to follow Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
precedent from an era before modern cell phones,1 or instead consider what
legal standards should apply in light of the dramatic changes in technology.
Generally, cell site location information (“CSLI”) is divided into two
categories, historical data and real-time (or “prospective”) data. Historical
data is past location data accumulated over time and stored by the cell ser-
vice provider, while real-time data is present data used to deduce the current
location of the cell phone. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (“ECPA”)2 addresses real-time data in a separate section than historical
data, which falls under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).3 The SCA
authorizes the government to obtain customer service records from providers
of electronic communications by obtaining a court order under 2703(d).4
While courts considering real-time or prospective CSLI have generally held
that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant
before gaining access to such data,5 courts have been slow to grant historical
CSLI the same protections. However, ECPA was enacted well before mod-
ern cell phone technology, and the fact that it allows a lower standard for
agents to acquire stored records “should carry little or no weight” on the
issue of CSLI.6
1. Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplica-
tion of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 522 (2012) (criticizing how “courts often
fall back on the rules . . . from an earlier technological era” in applying the Fourth Amendment
to surveillance technologies).
2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d) (2012).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ruby, No. 12-CR-1073 WQH, 2013 WL 544888, at *4–6
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 405–06 (D. Md.
2012); United States v. Gordon, No. 09-153-02 (RMU), 2012 WL 8499876, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb.
6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156,
at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re U.S. for Orders Authorizing Installation & Use of Pen
Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel. Numbers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md.
2006); see also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Ser-
vices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2010) (statement of Stephen W. Smith, U.S.
Mag. J.) (“Surveying the published opinions, it is fair to conclude that the majority held that
probable cause is the appropriate standard for government access to prospective cell site infor-
mation.”). Some courts have allowed access to real-time or prospective cell site location data
without a warrant, generally requiring the government to obtain a “hybrid order,” which con-
sists of an order under § 2703(d) as well as a pen register order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123. See
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law,
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 698–99 (2011).
6. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 738; see Susan Freiwald, Light in the Darkness: How the
LEATPR Standards Guide Legislators in Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site
Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 875, 877 (2014)(“In the intervening twenty-eight years,
Congress has not meaningfully updated the SCA’s records access provisions, let alone clari-
fied whether they apply to location records.”). A group of major technology companies, non-
profit organizations, civil liberties groups, and academics have formed the Digital Due Process
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This Note will focus on historical CSLI and why it deserves Fourth
Amendment protection, however, much of the analysis applies to CSLI gen-
erally. From a Fourth Amendment perspective, there is no “material differ-
ence” between historical and real-time CSLI, as the acquisition of either type
implicates the same reasonable expectations of privacy.7 The privacy inter-
ests that are implicated by government access to this data are not “meaning-
fully diminished” by a mere delay in disclosure.8 Jurisdictions that require a
warrant for real-time and not historical CSLI are leaving a loophole for law
enforcement agents, where they may take advantage of the distinction and
apply for instantaneously created “records” on an ongoing basis, calling it
historical CSLI.9 This loophole allows agents to completely circumvent the
warrant requirement.10 Many courts have recognized that the privacy con-
cerns are the same in historic and real-time tracking cases,11 and scholars
Coalition and recommended that Congress amend ECPA to remove distinctions between the
treatment of historical and forward-looking data. See DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.dig-
italdueprocess.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
7. In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code,
Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Historical Cell Site Info. for Mobile Phone
Identification Nos: (XXX) XXX-AAAA, (XXX) XXX-BBBB, & (XXX) XXX-CCCC, 509 F.
Supp. 2d 64, 76 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding no “material difference” between “real time,” pro-
spective, and historical tracking), reversed, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); see also
Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,
61–76 (2007) (arguing that stored data implicates reasonable expectations of privacy as much
as forward-looking data unless it is isolated to a single point in time); Our Principles, DIGITAL
DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=C00D74C0-3C03-11DF-
84C7000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (“The government should obtain a search
warrant based on probable cause before it can track, prospectively or retrospectively, the loca-
tion of a cell phone or other mobile communications device.”).
8. In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2008), affirmed, No. 07-524M,
2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, In re Application of U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d
Cir. 2010)[hereinafter Third Circuit Opinion].
9. See, e.g., United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (refusing to allow
the Government to convert an application for real time CSLI into one for historical CSLI by
claiming that the provider held the records briefly before delivering them); In re Application of
U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Site Location Info., No. 6:08-6038M-
REW, 2009 WL 8231744, at *10 n. 15 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2009) (calling the government’s
attempts to obtain “freshly-created records” of location data as an “end-run around the legal
limits on real-time access” and a “misuse of the SCA”).
10. See Freiwald, Light, supra note 6, at 896–97 (“The government’s ability to take
advantage of the lower protection for historical data as compared to real-time location data
adds urgency to the question of whether the two types of data should be treated the same in
any case.”).
11. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cellsite Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (arguing that the fact that information
is stored “says nothing about whether its creator has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information”); id. (“The picture of Tyshawn Augustus’s life the government seeks to obtain is
no less intimate simply because it has already been painted.”); see also In re United States for
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 839 (S.D. Tex. 2010) vacated, In re U.S. for
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agree that historical CSLI, “by virtue of creating a target’s complete digital
profile,” should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.12
In Part I of this Note, I will introduce the problematic statutory standard
of ECPA and the SCA, and summarize the split holdings of the Federal
Circuit Courts. In Part II, I will introduce the mechanics of CSLI and the
scope of government requests for such information, as well as the practices
of service providers and the precision of CSLI as a surveillance tool. In Part
III, I will conduct a Fourth Amendment analysis under the Katz test to show
that individuals maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in CSLI and
this expectation is recognized by society as objectively reasonable. Further-
more, I propose that the objective prong of the Katz analysis should be ap-
proached as a normative inquiry—courts should ask whether CSLI is the
type of information that should be protected by a warrant requirement. In
part IV, I will discuss how the third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI
because the criteria for applying the doctrine are absent in the context of
CSLI. In part V, I will discuss how the mosaic theory has swallowed up the
public/private distinction from past Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
explain that the mosaic theory is also inappropriate for resolving the privacy
concerns presented by CSLI. In part VI, I will propose judicial and legisla-
tive solutions, emphasizing the necessity for courts to act soon to protect
Americans’ privacy. The conclusion of this Note underlines the need for a
warrant requirement in order to preserve the fundamental principle of the
Fourth Amendment—to keep Americans protected from intrusive govern-
ment surveillance.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
Law enforcement agents can use a court order under section 2703(d) of
the SCA to obtain individuals’ CSLI from cell service providers. Courts in-
terpreting section 2703 have reached different conclusions as to whether this
statute governs CSLI and, if it does, what protections it affords this data. The
Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit courts have all decided the issue differ-
ently, leaving desperate need for a clear standard regarding what Fourth
Amendment protections apply to CSLI.
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)[hereinafter Fifth
Circuit Opinion] (“The temporal distinction between prospective and historical location track-
ing is not compelling, because the degree of invasiveness is the same, whether the tracking
covers the previous 60 days or the next.”). Tracey v. State, No. SC11-2254, 2014 WL 5285929
at *17 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2014), reh’g denied (Dec. 8, 2014) (citing a case addressing historical
CSLI and concluding the “same principle applies here, where real time cell site location infor-
mation used for tracking is at issue”).
12. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 739–40; see also Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and
Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic
Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 831 (2013).
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A. Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act, passed as part of ECPA, addresses
communications records generally but never includes the words “historical”
or “cell site.”13 Some courts have determined historical CSLI is outside the
scope of the SCA, because the SCA is limited to information pertaining to
wire or electronic communications, and those terms are defined to exclude
communications from a device “which permits the tracking of the movement
of a person or object.”14 Such courts reason that the government’s use of
CSLI characterizes the phone as a tracking device, and therefore the govern-
ment is required to obtain a warrant.15 Other courts, which have determined
or assumed that historical CSLI falls under the SCA, have found the statute
to be unclear and reached different conclusions about what procedural re-
quirements the government must meet in order to obtain historical CSLI.16
Sections 2703(a) and (b) of the SCA address circumstances in which a
governmental entity may require providers to disclose the contents of wire or
electronic communications.17 Here, the term “contents” is commonly under-
stood to refer to the communicated message.18 The statute generally requires
law enforcement agents to make a showing of probable cause and obtain a
warrant to acquire the contents of communications.19 Some courts have char-
acterized historical CSLI as “content” and found it should be protected by a
warrant requirement on that basis.20 On the other hand, sections 2703(c) and
(d) address the records of a customer’s use of electronic communications
services; the term “records” is generally understood to refer to information
about the communication that the service provider uses to process and de-
13. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous
Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
14. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, No.
07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, Third Circuit Opinion, supra
note 8.
15. Id. at 607 (stating that CSLI is “expressly placed outside the scope of the electronic
communications legislation of the SCA” and requiring government agents to meet probable
cause standard); see also, In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell
Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[P]ermitting surreptitious
conversion of a cell phone into a tracking device without probable cause raises serious Fourth
Amendment concerns.”).
16. See, e.g., Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8; Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11,
at 615 (emphasis added).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
18. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legisla-
tor’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 (2004) (“Content information
is the communication that a person wishes to share or communicate with another person.”).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(2012)(The statute includes a series of complicated distinctions
allowing access to some content without a warrant, but such distinctions are beyond the scope
of this Note.); id. at (b).
20. See section IV.B on CSLI as analogous to content information.
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liver the message.21 The statute requires law enforcement agents to present
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe” the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation” in order to obtain a court order for disclosure of service providers’
records under § 2703(d).22
Because the standard to acquire records is a much more lenient standard,
the government can gather much more information than a probable cause
standard would permit.23 Under the probable cause standard, the information
sought must itself be evidence of a crime.24 Under the 2703(d) standard,
however, law enforcement need only show the information sought is “rele-
vant and material to an ongoing investigation.”25 Also, there is no statutory
limit on the scope of the historical CSLI the government may request. The
only limit is the “length of time a target’s cell phone generates records and
the service provider stores them.”26 The government has been exploiting this
lower 2703(d) standard to conduct wide-ranging inquiries, gathering massive
amounts of CSLI for large numbers of cell phone users at a time.27
B. Federal Circuit Split
Federal appellate courts are split as to whether a warrant is required for
historical CSLI, suggesting the Supreme Court needs to make a definitive
ruling. The Third Circuit found that law enforcement agents may obtain his-
torical CSLI through a 2703(d) court order without violating the Fourth
21. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 1228 (“[N]oncontent information . . . is information
about the communication that the network uses to deliver and process the content
information.”).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d)(2012).
23. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 698; see also Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 315
(stating that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard for a 2703(d) order is “less stringent
than probable cause”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“This showing is lower
than the probable cause standard required for a search warrant.”).
24. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site
Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting a difference in the standards
because probable cause requires a finding that the information sought is itself evidence of a
crime rather than relevant and material to the investigation).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
26. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 698; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928, 2014
WL 6526854, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2014) (en banc) (stating the case involved the disclo-
sure of 67 consecutive days of cell tower site data, and the government, in seeking an order to
compel disclosure, asserted only that seven days of cell site data met the relevance and materi-
ality test).
27. Catherine Crump & Christopher Calabrese, Location Tracking: Muddled and Un-
certain Standards Harm Americans’ Privacy, 88 CRIM. L. REP. 19, 5 (2010) (describing a
recent case in which the FBI sought and received tracking information, without a warrant, for
180 people in addition to the criminal defendant). see section II-B on the nature of government
requests.
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Amendment.28 It cautioned, however, that agents are “not free from the war-
rant requirement”29 under the SCA, because historical CSLI may, in certain
circumstances, reveal private information protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.30 The court decided the statute allows a Magistrate Judge to use their
discretion to require a warrant to obtain historical CSLI.31 This holding
places a significant burden on Magistrate Judges to conduct a balancing test
without any clear instruction as how to administer it.32
Handling the question differently, the Fifth Circuit found that CSLI falls
under the Supreme Court line of precedent holding that an individual’s
records stored by a third party in their ordinary course of business are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.33 The court held that § 2703(d) orders
to obtain historical CSLI “for specified cell phones at the points at which the
user places and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitutional.”34
The court also differed from the Third Circuit by holding that the magistrate
judge has no discretion to deny the Government’s application for a
§ 2703(d) order that meets the statutory requirements.35 However, the court
was careful to note that the holding applied only to the “narrow issue” before
them,36 and admitted “specific orders [for CSLI] may be unconstitutional
because of additional facts involved in the case.”37 Therefore the Fifth Cir-
28. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 319. It is worth noting that the Third Circuit
decided the issue before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Jones, which
the Eleventh Circuit refers to as “the most instructive Supreme Court decision in the field.”
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit
Opinion], vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
29. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 318.
30. See id. at 312 (“The Knotts/Karo opinions make clear that the privacy interests at
issue are confined to the interior of the home. There is no evidence in this record that historical
CSLI. . . extends to that realm.”); see also id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“the magistrate
may refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order here only if she finds that the government failed to
present specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet the standard under § 2703(d) or, alter-
natively, finds that the order would violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of proba-
ble cause because it allows police access to information which reveals a cell phone user’s
location within the interior or curtilage of his home.”).
31. Id. at 319 (majority opinion) (remanding the case to the magistrate judge to decide if
a warrant should be required rather than a § 2703(d) order).
32. Freiwald, Light, supra note 6, at 889; see Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at
319 (“[W]e are stymied by the failure of Congress to make its intention [regarding whether to
require a warrant] clear.”); id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (complaining that the major-
ity’s interpretation “provides no standards for the approval or disapproval for an application
for an order under § 2703(d)”); see also Stephen W. Smith, Standing Up for Mr. Nesbitt, 47
U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 262 (2012) (“So despite a pressing need for appellate court guidance to
magistrate judges deluged with [ECPA] requests on a daily basis, almost none has been
given.”).
33. Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 615 (emphasis added)
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 614
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cuit case also fails to offer guidance to lower courts as to when they should
require a warrant to obtain historical CSLI.38
The Eleventh Circuit decided the issue differently from both the Third
and Fifth Circuits, holding that historical CSLI is within an individual’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and that obtaining such data without a war-
rant is a Fourth Amendment violation.39 This holding offers a clear and
workable standard for lower courts to apply and for the government to fol-
low. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, however, has been vacated and is cur-
rently scheduled for a rehearing en banc. The Fourth Circuit is also currently
considering the question on appeal.40 This state of affairs has left lower
courts, service providers, and individuals uncertain as to what Fourth
Amendment protections are afforded to CSLI. The constitutional question is
ripe for review by the Supreme Court, and the answer is simple: require a
warrant.
II. MODERN CELL PHONE TCHNOLOGY PROVIDES A MEANS FOR
INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
Today, it is estimated that more than 90 percent of American adults own
a cell phone.41 Many people treat their cell phones as a “virtual extensions”
of themselves, “using them for all manner of necessary and personal mat-
ters.”42 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that cell phones “are now
such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anat-
omy.”43 Cell phones are constantly generating and automatically sending a
wealth of location information to cell service providers who, in turn, store
38. See Freiwald, Light, supra note 6, at 889 (“The Fifth Circuit’s approach covers a
small subset of location data and gives little direction about the vast amount of data it leaves
unaddressed.”).
39. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1217.
40. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012) (appeal
currently pending before the Fourth Circuit). Defendant Aaron Graham filed an appeal with
the Fourth Circuit, challenging the district court’s ruling. Oral arguments took place on De-
cember 11, 2014 (Fourth Circuit schedule available at http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/calendar/
internetcaldec092014ric.pdf).
41. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (January 2014), http://www
.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet.
42. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2490 (2014) (“nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the
shower.”); see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“For many Americans,
there is no time in the day when they are more than a few feet away from their [cellular
telephones].”).
43. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2490 (2014).
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this information.44 Because cell phone users usually keep their cell phone on
or near their person, this information reveals their location at any given time.
A. The Technology behind CSLI
Cell phones operate by sending signals to transmitting stations known as
cell “sites” or “towers” which are strategically placed throughout the service
provider’s network.45 When a cell phone is on, it will automatically register
and identify with the nearest tower or the one with the strongest signal.46 The
cell phone automatically re-scans every seven seconds, or whenever the sig-
nal strength weakens, to make connections with cell sites.47 This automatic
identification is referred to as registration data. When a cell phone places or
receives a call, the phone must communicate with nearby cell towers to de-
termine which tower will handle the call.48 Initiation data indicates the near-
est cell tower (or towers) to the cell user when a call begins, and termination
data refers to such data created when the call ends.49 There is also duration
data, which includes a record of all the transmissions between the cell phone
and the nearest cell site(s) during a phone call.50
The specificity with which CSLI can track a user depends on the prox-
imity of cell sites, which vary by provider and location.51 Cell sites are gen-
erally built much closer to each other in urban areas due to the considerably
higher volume of calls in such areas. According to a recent Cellular Tele-
communications Industry Association study, the number of cell sites in the
U.S. has almost tripled in the last ten years.52 Cell service providers are
constructing “ever denser networks”53 to keep pace with the “explosive
growth” in the demand for wireless technology.54 In addition, service provid-
ers must “comply with federal regulations requiring them to provide emer-
gency dispatchers with increasingly precise coordinates for 911 calls placed
44. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 860 (Mass. 2014).
45. See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies
and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liber-
ties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of Matt Blaze, Asso-
ciate Professor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania).
46. See generally Id.
47. See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013); See also In re Pen Register &
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
48. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 702–03
49. Id. at 703.
50. Id. at 704–05.
51. See generally ECPA Reform supra, note 45 (statement of Matt Blaze).
52. See Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, at 2, http://
files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA__Survey_Midyear_2010_Graphics.pdf (reporting that the number of
cell sites in service increased forty percent in the last five years and had almost tripled in the
last ten years)
53. Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 630 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
54. ECPA Reform supra, note 45 (statement of Matt Blaze).
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by cell phone.”55 This has led to the development of new cell site technology
which can pinpoint an individual’s location in very small areas, such as “par-
ticular floors of buildings or even individual home and offices.”56 Analysts
can use triangulation methods on data from overlapping cell towers to find a
phone’s location at a level of accuracy approaching that of GPS
technology.57
B. Government Requests for CSLI
By obtaining historical CSLI, the government can figure out a suspect’s
location both at a particular time and across long periods of time to deter-
mine places an individual frequently visits and map their common routes.
Law enforcement requests for this information regularly include disclosure
of location data of seemingly innocent parties.58 Agents often request disclo-
sure of all calls handled by a particular cell tower in a “community of inter-
est,”59 or request the location data of “all of the associates who called or
made calls to a target.”60 Allowing law enforcement agencies to enjoy war-
rantless access to this information leaves more than 335 million Americans
at risk of surveillance.61
What is especially problematic is that courts may rely “at their peril” on
government representations about the limits of the location data they seek.62
In the case before the Third Circuit, the Government’s application for histor-
ical CSLI of a particular cell phone requested, “without limitation,” call ini-
55. Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 630 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing 911
Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1)).
56. ECPA Reform supra note 45 (statement of Matt Blaze) (discussing the invent of
“microcells”, “picocells” and “femtocells”).
57. Id. at 26; see also Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where
You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 312 (2004) (“The reality that people carry their cell phones on
their persons means that cell phone tracking technology potentially offers a detailed view of a
given subscriber’s movements rather than simply providing call-identifying information.”).
58. Crump, supra note 27, at 6 (“[I]t appears that the government took the dragnet
approach of getting location information for a large number of innocent people to try to figure
out who was involved in the crime.”).
59. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 29–30 (2010) (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (describing a
common practice of government agents seeking the “location [information] of the community
of interest—that is, the location of persons with whom the target communicates”)
60. Albert Gidari, Jr., Keynote Address: Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 557 (2007).
61. See Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, at 2, http://www
.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey (As of De-
cember 2013, there were 335.65 million wireless subscriber accounts in the United States,
responsible for 2.61 trillion annual minutes of calls and 1.91 trillion annual text messages.).
62. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 708.
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tiation and termination data, duration data, and registration data.63 However,
the government represented in its papers that it sought only initiation, dura-
tion, and termination data.64 This is a drastic discrepancy, as registration data
shows the cell phone’s location at least every seven seconds and provides
immensely more information. The government at oral argument further mis-
represented its application to the court, stating that it sought only initiation
and termination data and not registration or duration data.65 While this is
only one example, it suggests a larger issue that the government may not be
accurately describing, and courts not accurately assessing, the gravity of the
invasion of privacy in CSLI cases. The Fifth Circuit recognized this differ-
ence and was careful to note that its holding did not apply to orders request-
ing duration or registration data.66 Because of the ex parte and sealed nature
of the government’s requests, it is impossible to know whether other courts
have been misled as to the scope of government requests for CSLI.67
C. Disconnect between Service Provider Incentives and
Individuals’ Privacy Interests
Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that cell service providers
may not necessarily limit the records they furnish to the government to the
exact information requested. The interests of the service provider may not
align with an individual’s privacy interests, as profit motives can “impel
providers to make disclosure decisions based on the lowest cost rather than
to decide based on the best interests of the target.”68 Considering the scope
of the service provider’s records, “there would be neither reason nor way for
providers to filter the data in order to deliver only limited data.”69 The infor-
mation conveyed to the government can include “duration, registration, tri-
angulation, and GPS data, all of which can provide an extremely rich and
63. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 308 (citing App. at 64 and quoting from the
“heavily redacted” application to the Magistrate Judge.).
64. See Gov’t Reply Brief at 6, Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, (No. 08-4227)
(citing the exemplar submitted to the district court as proof that the information sought by the
government is limited to date, time, telephone number, the cell tower used to connect to the
call, the cell tower used at the end of the call, and the duration of the call).
65. See Oral Argument at 35:06–36:19, Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, available
at www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings, file 08-4227-ApplicationofUSA.wma (ar-
guing that location data in the exemplar was recorded only when calls were started or ended
and points out that the exemplar did not include registration data).
66. Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 615.
67. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 717–18.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After
the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 1010–13 (1996) (questioning the calcula-
tion that equates service provider interests with subscribers’ privacy interests, particularly
when subscribers will not find out about disclosures).
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precise picture of a target’s movements” and the government “will likely
receive more information than they request.”70
In fact, the number of requests that service providers receive on a daily
basis is incredibly burdensome. As AT&T explained in its amicus brief for
the Eleventh Circuit rehearing en banc, it had to create a separate center that
operates on a continuous basis just to respond to judicial orders and subpoe-
nas.71 AT&T asked the court to announce a categorical standard for all gov-
ernment orders seeking historical CSLI, so that clear rules can be set for law
enforcement agents, lower courts, and service providers to ensure they are
able to protect legitimate privacy concerns and law enforcement interests.72
D. Precision of CSLI as a Surveillance Tool
The Government often argues, as shown in Davis, that CSLI should be
less protected than GPS data because it is “less precise.”73 The Eleventh
Circuit expressly rejected this argument, rationalizing that “the information
is sufficiently specific that the prosecutor expressly relied on it in summing
up to the jury.”74 The fact that CSLI may in some instances fall short of the
precision of GPS data does not necessarily mean it prevents law enforcement
from tracking an individual’s physical movements. As the Third Circuit
stated: “even imprecise information, when combined with visual surveil-
lance or a known address, can enable law enforcement to infer the exact
location of a phone.”75 The government routinely uses CSLI this way. More-
over, the government has advised juries in various cases that it “should rely
on the accuracy of the cell tower records to infer that an individual, or at
least her cell phone, was at home.”76 Even the Fifth Circuit admitted that
“the reason the Government seeks such information is to locate or track a
suspect in a criminal investigation” and that “[t]he data must be precise
enough to be useful to the Government, which would suggest that, at least in
some cases, it can narrow someone’s location to a fairly small area.”77 Any
70. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 718.
71. Brief for AT&T as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2–3, United States v.
Davis, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (No-12-12928). AT&T’s center employs
more than 100 full time employees, and for the first half of 2014, the center processed nearly
116,000 requests for various types of information.
72. Id. at 30
73. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1216 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App’x
925 (11th Cir. 2014).
74. Id.
75. Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 15, United
States v. Davis, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (No-12-12928).
76. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 311–12
77. Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 609.
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difference in precision between CSLI and GPS does not have “constitutional
significance.”78
Not to mention, the argument that CSLI is imprecise is contradicted by
the statements of experts in the field of modern cell phone technology who
compare it favorably to GPS-technology in some cases. Matt Blaze, an As-
sociate Professor of Computer and Information Science at the University of
Pennsylvania, said the following in his statement to Congress:
As the precision provided by cellular network-based location ap-
proaches that of GPS-based tracking technology, cellular location
tracking can have significant advantages for law enforcement sur-
veillance operations compared with traditional GPS trackers. New
and emerging cell location techniques can work indoors and in
places not typically accessible to GPS receivers. Cell phone location
information is quietly and automatically calculated by the network,
without unusual or overt intervention that might be detected by the
subject. And the ‘tracking device’ is now a benign object already
carried by the target – his or her own telephone.79
This information proves that CSLI cannot be compared to information ob-
tained by “a policeman following someone on a public street,” because to
make such a claim would be to “fundamentally misunderstand the richness
of [CSLI] and the power of its use as a surveillance tool.”80 CSLI provides a
precise and comprehensive record of a cell phone user’s movements at virtu-
ally any time day, whether they are in public or private, and the government
should have to show probable cause before accessing such sensitive
information.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.”81 The government conducts a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment when it “violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”82 Justice Harlan first articu-
lated this standard in 1967 in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
78. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1216 (“[The fact that] information ob-
tained by an invasion of privacy may not be entirely precise does not change the calculus as to
whether obtaining it was in fact an invasion of privacy.”).
79. See ECPA Reform, supra note 45 (statement of Matt Blaze).
80. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 709.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
82. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
Spring 2015] No More Shortcuts 377
and the Supreme Court has since used it repeatedly when considering al-
leged Fourth Amendment violations.83
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy and its protections apply to emerging cell phone technology. The
Supreme Court has recognized that permitting the government to exploit
new technology would “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment.”84 The reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy must
be determined in light of technological progress, because it would be an
“Orwellian notion” to assume that “previous liberties derived from the
Framers simply shrink as the government acquires new means of infringing
them.”85 Indeed, “it hardly makes sense to read Katz as meaning that we
assume the risk of whatever technology the government can bring to bear
upon its investigative efforts.”86 There is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in CSLI, and the government obtaining such data constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment. It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures without a warrant “are presumptively unreasonable,”
with only a few limited exceptions.87 None of these exceptions apply to
CSLI, partially because of its unique nature, and therefore warrantless access
to historical CSLI constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
A. Subjective Expectations of Privacy in CSLI
As Justice Stevens stated: “As a general matter, the private citizen is
entitled to assume, and in fact does assume, that his possessions are not
infected with concealed electronic devices.”88 Most Americans have no idea
that cell service providers store vast amounts of CSLI and allow the govern-
ment warrantless access to it.89 This was illustrated in 2011, when consum-
ers learned that iPhones stored ten months of location data in an unencrypted
format; the rapid influx of consumer complaints led Apple to revise its entire
iPhone operating system within a week to protect consumers’ location infor-
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
84. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
85. People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 305 (Cal. 1985); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34
(“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
86. Wayne LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 307 (1986).
87. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004).
88. Karo, 468 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. See Freiwald, supra note 5, at 743 (“Most cell phone users would be unpleasantly
surprised, if not outraged, to learn that a law enforcement agent could gain access to their
location information without first obtaining a warrant based on a showing of probable cause.”).
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mation.90 Cell phone users maintain their expectation of privacy in their lo-
cation information, because they cannot assume the risk of disclosure if they
are not even aware that this information is being shared.91 People expect law
enforcement agents to obtain a warrant before bugging individuals’ phones
and monitoring their calls, and for the same reason, people expect such a
requirement before law enforcement agents can use individuals’ cell phones
to track their movements for any period of time.92
Research shows that Americans expect privacy in their CSLI. In No-
vember 2014, the Pew Research Center found that 82 percent of American
adults considered data showing the details of their physical location over
time to be sensitive information—more sensitive than the content of their
text messages, their relationship history, their web browser history, their re-
ligious views, or their political views.93 Similarly, a 2008 research report
showed that 73 percent of cell phone users responded that they favored re-
quiring “the police to convince a judge that a crime has been committed
before obtaining historical location information from the cell phone com-
pany.”94 The report also showed that 72 percent of respondents supported a
law requiring police to give notice to the cell user before they may obtain
historical records of location data.95 Also, the Pew Research Center found in
2012 that cell phone users take a number of steps to protect their personal
information and mobile data, showing that more than half of cell users have
chosen to uninstall or not install an app due to concerns about maintaining
the privacy of their personal information.96 This research shows cell phone
users are far from comfortable with sharing their location information, and
90. Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple Q&A on Location Data (April 27, 2011) (availa-
ble at https:// www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html).
91. Fourth Amendment - Warrantless Searches - New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That
State Constitution Requires Police to Obtain Warrant Before Accessing Cell-Site Location
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2169 (2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment]; See
Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 317–18.
92. See Freiwald, supra note 5, at 744–45 (“For the same reasons that people expect a
law enforcement agent to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before he may bug their
conversations, monitor their phone calls, or subject them to silent video surveillance, people
would surely expect judicial oversight of an agent’s use of their cell phones to track their
movements and activities.”).
93. Mary Madden, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SE-
CURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, 36–37 (Nov. 2014), available at http://www.pewinternet
.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ (50% of American adults consider their location
information to be “very sensitive”).
94. Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Research Report: A Supermajority of Califor-
nians Supports Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Phone Location Information 8–9
(Apr. 18, 2008)(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137988.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Jan Lauren Boyles, Aaron Smith, and Marry Madden, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRI-
VACY AND DATA MANAGEMENT ON MOBILE DEVICES, (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www
.pewinternet.org/2012/09/05/privacy-and-data-management-on-mobile-devices/.
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they are certainly against law enforcement agents using individuals’ cell
phones to track their every movement.97
Even with all this subjective evidence, the focus of a court’s Fourth
Amendment analysis should be on the normative inquiry demanded by the
second prong of the Katz test. Four years after enunciating the famous Katz
test, Justice Harlan stated that a court’s analysis must “transcend the search
for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk,”98 and
he called for courts to conduct a normative inquiry.99 The Supreme Court
validated Harlan’s view in Smith v. Maryland, stating that there are situa-
tions “where an individual’s subjective expectations ha[ve] been ‘condi-
tioned’ by influences alien to the well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms,” and in such circumstances, a normative inquiry becomes neces-
sary to determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.100 In
other words, when an individual lacks an actual expectation of privacy in
something merely because he has experienced or been told that he lacks any
privacy in it; courts should apply a normative analysis.101
B. Objective Expectations of Privacy in CSLI:
A Normative Approach
The second prong of the Katz test is the determination of whether soci-
ety recognizes the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy as reasona-
ble.102 This prong requires courts to “make a normative finding about
whether users should be entitled to view the object of the search as pri-
vate.”103 Justice Harlan explained that the critical question for courts to as-
sess is “whether, under our system of government, as reflected in the
Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risk of the electronic
listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant require-
ment.”104 Advances in technology certainly require special consideration be-
cause they implicate unique concerns for protecting individual’s privacy.
97. See Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been?
Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 307, 316 (2004) (“[P]eople are likely to reject the prospect of turning every cell
phone into a tracking device.”).
98. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786–87 (1971).
99. See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This question must, in my view, be answered by
assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individ-
ual’s sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law
enforcement.”).
100. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n. 5 (1979).
101. See id. (“For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide
television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereaf-
ter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers,
and effects”).
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 745.
104. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court in Riley v. California emphasized that cell phones pre-
sent novel privacy concerns as they store “qualitatively different” types of
data than traditional physical records.105 In order to properly analyze the
scope of the privacy interests at stake, courts must account for the fact that
modern technology can store vastly greater amounts of data and disclose
much more revealing personal information than past technology.106
1. Supreme Court Support for a Normative Approach
There are five Supreme Court justices who, through concurring opinions
in United States v. Jones, expressed concern over the particularly sensitive
nature of location information and the implications that evolving technology
will have on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.107 Justice Alito, in a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, recognized
that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not [. . .] secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.”108 While Jones involved data gath-
ered from a GPS device, Justice Alito elaborated in his opinion to discuss
how recent developments in technology have led to the emergence of many
new devices with tracking capabilities, and he specifically pointed to cell
phones as the most significant development.109 He also cautioned that use of
these new devices would “continue to shape the average person’s expecta-
tions about the privacy of his or her daily movements,”110 suggesting that
such new surveillance methods would shift the Katz analysis to focus on
normative considerations.
Justice Sotomayor also made clear her concern about protecting location
information, as she questioned the “appropriateness of entrusting to the Ex-
ecutive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so
amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to
curb arbitrary exercise of police power to [sic] and prevent ‘a too permeating
police surveillance.’”111 Though expressed in the context of GPS surveil-
lance, this concern applies equally to CSLI because it is a “tool so amenable
to misuse” as demonstrated by the nature of government requests for such
information.112 In addition, Justice Sotomayor stated she would “not assume
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
105. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
106. Cf. id. at 2491.
107. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
108. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 595 (1948)).
112. See supra Part II-B (discussing the nature of government requests).
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protection” because “whatever the societal expectations, [such expectations]
can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”113 This
shows that Justice Sotomayor would focus her analysis on the question of
whether CSLI is the type of information that society should legitimately ex-
pect the Fourth Amendment to protect with a warrant requirement.
2. Courts Adopting a Normative Approach
Many federal and state courts addressing CSLI have adopted a norma-
tive approach to the objective prong of the Katz test and found that society is
entitled to expect privacy in such information.114 The Eleventh Circuit recog-
nized that CSLI was “private in nature” because it could place someone
“near the home of a lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of wor-
ship, or a house of ill repute,” and found that individuals are entitled to have
such information guarded by a warrant requirement.115 Federal district courts
reflected this sentiment, finding that to withhold Fourth Amendment protec-
tions from historical CSLI “would [be to] permit governmental intrusion into
information which is objectively recognized as highly private.”116 These
courts recognized that “[i]n light of drastic developments in technology, the
Fourth Amendment doctrine must evolve” in order to preserve society’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.117
113. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1217 (11th Cir.) vacated, 573
F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Tracey v.
State, No. SC11-2254, 2014 WL 5285929 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2014), reh’g denied (Dec. 8, 2014);
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E. 3d 846 (Mass. 2014).
115. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1216–17.
116. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also id. at 119 (“[T]he collec-
tion of cell-site-location records effectively enables “mass” or “wholesale” electronic surveil-
lance, and raises greater Fourth Amendment concerns than a single electronically surveilled
car trip.”); see also In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d
827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11 (“[Cell phone track-
ing] will also inevitably be more intrusive [than GPS tracking], because the phone can be
monitored indoors where the expectation of privacy is greatest.”); In re U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp.
2d 585, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2008), vacated, Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8 (stating that Fourth
Amendment protections depend on the “nature of the records or information sought”).
117. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 127; see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.
Supp. 2d at 845 (“[C]onsumers are not forced to sacrifice locational privacy as the price of
using cell phones.”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d (Nov. 29, 2010) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment’s concept of an ‘unreasonable’ intrusion into one’s personal affairs, by its
very nature” must “evolve along with the myriad ways in which humans contrive to interact
with one another.”).
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Several State Supreme Courts have also held that CSLI is private in
nature and should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.118 For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that cell phone users are “entitled to
expect confidentiality in the ever-increasing level of detail that cell phones
can reveal about their lives,” because cell phones are not meant to serve as
tracking devices.119 Following suit, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found
that historical CSLI allows law enforcement to “track and reconstruct a per-
son’s past movements” to an extent that was never possible through tradi-
tional investigation methods.120 The Florida Supreme Court confirmed that
society is “now prepared to recognize” individual’s expectations of privacy
in CSLI as objectively reasonable under the Katz test.121
The Sixth Circuit opinion in Warshak, though it addressed stored e-
mails, is also instructive in its emphasis on the need for a normative ap-
proach to the Katz analysis. The Sixth Circuit stated, “[a]s some forms of
communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize
and protect nascent ones that arise.”122 The Warshak court reasoned that,
because e-mail “plays an indispensable part in the Information Age,” it re-
quires strong Fourth Amendment protection; otherwise, the Fourth Amend-
ment would be an “ineffective guardian of private communication, an
essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve.”123
Cell phones play an equally indispensable part in modern society, and
the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect the tremendous amounts
of personal data this emerging technology generates. If the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections were to narrow each time society became accustomed to
their private information being acquired by law enforcement without a war-
rant, then surely as means of surveillance technology increase, constitutional
protections will continue to be diminished, and eventually, cease to exist
altogether.124
118. Tracey, 2014 WL 5285929; Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E. 3d 846 (Mass.
2014); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013). In New Jersey, there is no third-party
doctrine, and the case was decided based on whether the government violated an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Earls, 70 A.3d at 632.
119. Earls, 70 A.3d at 643 (“People buy cell phones to communicate with others, to use
the Internet, and for a growing number of other reasons. But no one buys a cell phone to share
detailed information about their whereabouts with the police”); see also id. (“[I]n 2006, cell
phones could be tracked to within a one-mile radius or less of the nearest cell tower” and “that
distance has narrowed to the point that cell phones can be pinpointed with great precision—to
within feet in some instances”).
120. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 865.
121. Tracey, 2014 WL 5285929 at *18–19.
122. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
123. Id.
124. See supra FN 99–101 about how individuals cannot have their Fourth Amendment
rights conditioned by government intrusion.
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3. Statutory Provisions Suggest Special Protection for CSLI
Courts should take into account Congressional intent in passing statu-
tory protections for CSLI,125 because an act of Congress affecting a proprie-
tary interest is “undeniably relevant to the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy
inquiry.”126 So far five states, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, and
Utah, have passed statutes requiring law enforcement to apply for a search
warrant to obtain historical CSLI,127 while several other state legislatures
have recognized the threat to privacy and are still in the process of passing a
warrant requirement.128 In addition, numerous other states have passed laws
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before accessing real-time
CSLI.129 This shows a trend that society is increasingly recognizing the pri-
vate nature of CSLI and demanding “the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion.”130
Furthermore, the Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of
1999 (“WCPSA”),131 which was enacted after the SCA and specifically ad-
dresses location data, “sends a strong signal to protect cell phone location
data.”132 The WCPSA prohibits cell-service providers from disclosing “indi-
vidually identifiable customer proprietary network information,” including
location data, except as required by law or with customer approval.133 This
suggests that Congress “intended individuals’ privacy interest in location
data be given particular weight in privacy assessments.”134 The WCPSA also
125. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“state laws
are indicative that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our soci-
ety recognizes as reasonable”); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2000) (federal
statutory protection “is relevant to the determination of whether there is a ‘societal understand-
ing’ that Doe has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his treatment records.”); United States
v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal wiretap statute is “strong evidence”
that society would find warrantless video surveillance unreasonable).
126. In re Application of U.S. for An Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2010) vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion supra note 11.
127. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-303.5(2) (West 2014); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 16, § 648
(2014); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 626A.28(3)(d), 626A.42(2) (West 2014); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-
5-110(1)(a) (2014); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (West 2014).
128. See, e.g., S. 1052, 2013 Leg., 83d Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); see also Hanni Fakhoury,
New Massachusetts Decision Requires a Warrant for Cell Tracking, DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb.
19, 2014), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/massachusetts-requires-war-
rants-cell-tracking (describing pending state bills to require warrants for location records). But
see S. 1434, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (vetoed by Governor on Sept. 30, 2012).
129. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-5-12 (West 2014); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.373(2)
(West 2014)
130. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
131. Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
132. Fourth Amendment, supra note 91, at 1227.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), (h)(1) (2008).
134. Fourth Amendment, supra note 91, at 1226; see In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2010) vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note
11, (“The fact that WCPSA imposes heightened privacy protection for a customer’s call loca-
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states that “[a] customer shall not be considered to have approved the use or
disclosure of or access to” CSLI.135 This indicates Congress did not intend
CSLI to be treated as normal business records and should not be governed
by that line of Supreme Court precedent, because that analysis “depends on
assuming customers have consented to disclosure.”136 The federal statutory
protection in the WCPSA provides much greater instruction for how to treat
CSLI than ECPA, which was passed well before legislators conceived of the
capabilities of modern cell phone tracking.
4. Normative Considerations Demand a Warrant Requirement for CSLI
Based on a normative inquiry, it is clear that the second prong of the
Katz test is satisfied, and society is entitled to a legitimate expectation of
privacy in CSLI. The pervasiveness of cell phones in society, combined with
the fact that most Americans keep their cell phone on their person at all
times, allows cell service providers to store records of the location of “al-
most every American at almost every time of day and night.”137 When the
government obtains CSLI, it can retrace the steps of a cell phone user’s
physical movements and ultimately create a map of his life, learning “the
many things we reveal about ourselves through our physical presence.”138
Courts and legislatures on both the federal and state level have indicated that
location information is sensitive, personal, and subject to special protection.
tion information is highly relevant, especially given that the topic of wireless phone location is
specifically mentioned in only one other federal statute, CALEA, which forbids its acquisition
by law enforcement under the very relaxed standard for pen registers.”).
135. 47 U.S.C. § 222(f)(1) (2008).
136. Fourth Amendment, supra note 91, at 1227; see In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 841–42 (noting that the WCPSA establishes that cell-site data is “not
a proprietary business record subject to unfettered corporate control”).
137. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Eleventh Circuit Opinion,
supra note 28 (holding that “one’s cell phone, unlike an automobile, can accompany its owner
anywhere” and exposure of a cell phone user’s location data “can convert what would other-
wise be a private event into a public one.”).
138. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 115; see also Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at
1216 (explaining that “there is a reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of a lover,
or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a house of ill repute.”); United States
v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing how the government can use CSLI
to discern whether the cell phone user is a “weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at
the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, [or] an associate of
particular individuals or political groups.”); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that people “reasonably expect that their move-
ments will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascer-
tain . . . their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d
630, 642 (N.J. 2013) (finding a cell user’s privacy expectation in their location data to be
reasonable because such information can “provide an intimate picture of one’s daily life” by
revealing “not just where people go . . . but also the people and groups they choose to affiliate
with and when they actually do so.”).
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The Fourth Amendment cannot be read to “impose” on society “the dilemma
of either ceding to the state any meaningful claim to personal privacy or
effectively withdrawing from a technologically maturing society.”139 The
Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy, and a nor-
mative inquiry proves that CSLI is exactly the type of private information
that must be zealously guarded from government exploitation.
The solution cannot be to rely on shortcuts such as the third-party doc-
trine or the public/private distinction, as these mechanisms are created by
Supreme Court cases from the 1970s and 80s. Those cases “addressed primi-
tive ancestors of the electronic communications technologies in use to-
day.”140 Any effort to distinguish historical CSLI from other types of
protected information depends on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
Fourth Amendment, as it requires the assumption that the private nature of
information can somehow be meaningless to the constitutional analysis.
IV. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO CSLI
When an individual discloses information to a third party, the third-party
doctrine states the individual has given up his Fourth Amendment rights
regarding the revealed information.141 The doctrine, articulated by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Miller, stems from the Katz test and draws
on the idea that an individual no longer has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information revealed to third parties.142 This doctrine has been criti-
cized by Fourth Amendment scholars as fundamentally wrong and
misguided.143 Criticism aside, such a doctrine is inapt in the context of mod-
ern cell phone technology, for three main reasons: (1) CSLI is not an ordi-
nary business record, (2) CSLI is analogous to “content” information, and
(3) CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed by the cell phone user to a third party.
The privacy concerns raised by government access to CSLI should not be
139. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d (Nov. 29, 2010).
140. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 682.
141. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009).
142. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
143. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, §§ 2.7(b)–(c) (4th ed. 2004) (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions applying
the third-party doctrine as making a “mockery of the Fourth Amendment”); CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, 151–64 (2007); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211 (2006)
(arguing that the major third-party doctrine cases were wrongly decided on several grounds);
Freiwald, supra note 7; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Pro-
tecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975
(2007); Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity
in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1092 (2006) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court should overrule the third-party doctrine).
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discarded by resort to the third-party doctrine, because “the digital age” has
dramatically altered the “societal landscape” since the 1970s.144
A. CSLI is Not an Ordinary Business Record
United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland are the two Supreme
Court cases which apply the third-party doctrine, and they establish that
bank statements and pen register records are accessible without a warrant
because they are obtained by a third party in their ordinary course of busi-
ness.145 Both of these cases were decided in the late 1970’s, an era that pre-
dates cell phones.146 This fact alone is enough to suggest that these cases
should not control courts’ treatment of CSLI, as the data at issue is funda-
mentally different.147 CSLI records are more analogous to the records of a
tracking device than ordinary business records, as the information is a col-
lection of signal transmissions which the cell phone generates automatically
just by operating.148
In the case of both Miller and Smith, the customer was provided with
receipts and monthly statements of their transactions with the third party,
which organized the information and presented it to the customer for review.
There is no analogous receipt or monthly statement presented to a cell phone
user regarding his location information. Indeed, CSLI is “neither tangible
nor visible to a cell phone user.”149 As a practical matter, records of CSLI
appear radically different than any kind of business record or “bill that a
144. Commonwealth v. Augustine 4 N.E.3d 846, 859 (Mass. 2014).
145. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
746–747 (1979). Courts treating historical data differently than real-time data have generally
relied on Miller and Smith without offering any explanation as to why it should be treated
differently. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No.2:09 CR 89, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2–3
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010)(holding that by “having no Seventh Circuit precedent on the issue,
this court is persuaded by the well-reasoned decision of the Suarez-Blanca court that the logic
of the Supreme Court in Smith and Miller should be extended to cell-site data.”); United States
v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,
2008) (relying on Smith and Miller in determining that “historical cell site information is akin
to other business records maintained in the course of business”); see also In re United States
for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device,
622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that “this court concludes that a
request for historical cell-site data when the phone is idle does not raise the same concerns as
might a request for real-time cell-site data when the phone is idle.”)
146. See Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 857 (Mass. 2014) (“The [third-party] doctrine has its
roots in a pair of United States Supreme Court cases that predate cellular telephones.”)
147. See section III-B-iii for discussion on how federal statute, WCPSA, indicates that
CSLI should not be considered under the third-party doctrine.
148. See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 312. (“If it can be used to allow the
inference of present, or even future, location, in this respect CSLI may resemble a tracking
device which provides information as to the actual whereabouts of the subject.”)
149. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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customer would actually see.”150 Unlike bank statements or pen register
records, “CSLI is not subject to general understanding any more than the
operation of a satellite television signal,” and just to interpret the data, one
must have “an understanding of radio frequency engineering.”151 In the
Third Circuit litigation, the exemplar provided by the government “had none
of the trappings of a communication with a customer, such as the sub-
scriber’s name, account number, or address,” but rather appeared to be a
report drawn from a database of raw location data.152 In another case, the
provider actually digitally transmitted the CSLI stored in their system to a
government-maintained computer, and then the government had to use a
software program to translate the data into a usable spreadsheet.153 This
transfer of raw data is certainly not analogous to ordinary business records
provided by a bank or pen register, which are comprehensible without any
interpretation or translation. This raw data is unfiltered, unorganized, and
only translated by the government after it has obtained the information.
Miller reasoned that bank records are not “confidential communica-
tions,” rather they are “negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.”154 Similarly, Smith reasoned that pen registers are “routinely
used” by phone companies to check billing operations, detect fraud, and pre-
vent violations of law.155 In contrast, service providers’ retention of CSLI
does not “generally serve any business purpose for the customer or for the
provider in serving the customer,” and such information is retained “princi-
pally, if not exclusively, in response to Government directive.”156 CSLI is
not stored for commercial use, it is stored to provide law enforcement agents
150. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 734; see In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclo-
sure of Telecomm. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining how the provider digitally transmitted stored
cell site data to the government, which had to then “use a software program to translate that
data into a usable spreadsheet”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“Miller involved simple business records, as opposed to the potentially unlimited
variety of ‘confidential communications’ at issue [in a stored email case]” (quoting Miller, 425
U.S. at 443)).
151. En Banc Brief of the Appellant Quartavious Davis at 30, United States v. Davis, 573
Fed. App’x. 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928), 2014 WL 7232613, at *30.
152. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 717 (citing Exemplar, Brief for the United States, Exhibit
C, Document 11-4, Third Circuit Opinion supra note 8, (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866618).
153. In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records &
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
154. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
155. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (citing United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–175 (1977)).
156. In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 615 (W.D. Pa. 2008) vacated, Third Circuit Opin-
ion, supra note 8; see supra Part II-C discussing AT&T practices; see also Freiwald, supra
note 5, at 718 (stating that service providers store location data “in anticipation of law enforce-
ment requests.”).
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with tracking information, and therefore it cannot be treated as an ordinary
business record.
B. CSLI is Analogous to Content
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has incorporated “an examination of in-
trusiveness into its assessment of objective reasonableness.”157 In both
Miller and Smith, the Court emphasized that the nature of the information at
issue is a critical part of the Fourth Amendment analysis.158 In Smith, the
Court distinguished between content and non-content information, and the
limited amount of data a pen register could record was highly relevant to the
Court’s determination.159 The content/non-content distinction was included
in the SCA, which protects content by a warrant requirement, and leaves
non-content unprotected.160 As noted above, this statute was passed in 1986,
“well before the explosion of new communications technologies”161 and it
does not consider the implications of such a distinction for CSLI.162 As
Smith illustrates, the determination of whether information is content or non-
content requires consideration of the nature of the information. The distinc-
tion must be understood in light of evolving technology, and the fact that
modern cell phone technology is not hindered by the “limited capabilities”
of a pen register163 proves that it is “questionable and far from clearly estab-
lished” whether Smith can justify applying the third-party doctrine to
CSLI.164
While Smith offers guidance by encouraging an assessment of the nature
of the information, it is commonly misapplied by courts to classify CSLI as
a third-party business record, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.165 The
157. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 430 (2007).
158. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“We must examine the na-
ture of the particular documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether there is a
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 741 (1979) (“[I]t is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state
activity that is challenged.”).
159. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
160. See supra Part I-A on the Stored Communications Act.
161. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 740.
162. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1264, 1277 (2004) (“[The] ECPA was amended a number of times, although these
amendments made relatively minor changes to the structure of ECPA.”); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How A Suppression Remedy Would Change Com-
puter Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814 (2003) (“Although ECPA has been amended
many times since 1986, the 1986 Act set the basic framework of Internet surveillance law: all
subsequent changes have merely nibbled around the edges of the law.”).
163. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
164. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010).
165. See Fourth Amendment supra note 91, at 1220, 1224 (discussing how the Fifth
Circuit determined that cell site data are business records governed by Smith and used that
finding as dispositive of the Fourth Amendment question, and stating that the Fifth Circuit
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pen register record in Smith showed a mere three days’ worth of numbers
dialed out from a landline telephone, which was installed at an address pro-
vided to the phone company when service was requested. Therefore, Smith’s
holding has little relevance in the context of CSLI. A cell phone is undenia-
bly distinguishable from a landline phone in a “fixed location such as a resi-
dence,” because “a cell phone accompanies its user throughout the day”
making location information obtainable at any given point.166 In the words of
one Magistrate Judge, “Two months’ worth of hourly tracking data will in-
evitably reveal a rich slice of the [cell phone] user’s life, activities, and as-
sociations [. . .] If the telephone numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland were
notes on a musical scale, the location data sought here is a grand opera.”167
Fortunately, an increasing number of courts have recognized that rea-
sonable expectations of privacy are not extinguished just because a third
party stores the information.168 For example, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment protection covering content should also cover
“the transmission of [content] itself when it reveals information about the
personal source of the transmission, specifically his location.”169 The court
recognized that CSLI is “private in nature” and analogized it to communica-
tions data, as “even one point of [CSLI] can be within a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.”170 The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the content/non-content
distinction with an eye toward the sensitive nature of CSLI, concluding that
such data requires the same protection that the SCA grants to “content” in-
formation. Similarly, a district court in New York recognized “there is no
meaningful Fourth Amendment distinction between content and other forms
of information, the disclosure of which to the Government would be equally
intrusive and reveal information society values as private.”171 These opinions
reflect the growing view that a normative inquiry is necessary to a proper
Fourth Amendment analysis, and because government access to CSLI is as
“unwisely declined to apply a normative analysis asking whether location data should be pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment”) (citing Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11); see also id.
(stating that the Fifth Circuit “unwisely declined to apply a normative analysis asking whether
location data should be protected by the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis added).
166. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 n.67 (S.D. Tex.
2010), vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11.
167. Id. at 846.
168. See section III-B-ii on courts adopting a normative approach in context of CSLI. See
also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (explaining that letters do not lose Fourth
Amendment protection despite being deposited with the post office and handled by numerous
other people); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing
that the fact that a third party may access or even chooses to access information or data fails
“to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
169. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1213.
170. Id. at 1216.
171. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125–126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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intrusive as government access to content information, it should be granted
equal protection.
C. Cell Phone Users Do Not Voluntarily Convey
Their Location Information
Application of the third-party doctrine is further inappropriate in the
context of CSLI because the cell phone user does not “voluntarily convey”
their location information when making or receiving a call, let alone simply
by turning on their cell phones. Miller and Smith both emphasize that the
defendant “voluntarily conveyed” the information to a third party, thereby
waiving any reasonable expectation of privacy. The act of using a cell
phone, or merely having it turned on, generates location data as a by-prod-
uct, and such an act cannot be regarded as an indication that an individual
has no interest in maintaining their privacy.172
The Court’s holding in Miller relied heavily on its finding that “all of
the documents obtained [by the government], including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”173
The Smith Court similarly relied on the notion that when dialing a phone
number, the caller “voluntarily conveys numerical information to the tele-
phone company.”174 It is worth noting that Justice Brennan questioned the
reasoning in Miller, recognizing that “for all practical purposes, the disclo-
sure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not
entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”175 Justice Bren-
nan’s point would apply with greater force to CSLI as cell phone use in
modern society permeates daily life to such an extent it would hardly be
reasonable to expect individuals seeking privacy to simply not own a cell
phone.176 Even if we assume, however, that the reasoning in Miller is sound,
Miller and Smith do not apply to CSLI because a cell phone user’s conduct
172. See En Banc Brief of the Appellant Quartavious Davis at 30, United States v. Davis,
573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928), 2014 WL 6526854 at *15 (“the simple act
of using, or even carrying, a cell phone, which has the by-product of generating location data,
does not indicate a disinterest in maintaining privacy.”).
173. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
174. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
175. Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. See ECPA (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 48 (2013) (testimony of Professor Matt Blaze) (“There is perhaps
no more ubiquitous symbol of our highly connected society than the cellular telephone. Over
the course of only a few short decades, mobile communication devices have evolved from
being little more than an expensive curiosity for the wealthy into a basic necessity for most
Americans, transforming the way we communicate with one another, do business, and obtain
and manage the increasing volume of information that is available to us.”)
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is “materially different from the active, deliberate choices made to disclose
information in Smith and Miller.”177 CSLI is automatically transmitted “en-
tirely independent of the [cell phone] user’s input, control, or knowledge.”178
When a cell phone user makes a call, he only knowingly conveys the num-
ber dialed, and there is no indication that his location information is being
stored.179 Not to mention the cell phone user “hasn’t voluntarily exposed
anything at all” when he receives a call,180 or when he merely turns on his
phone, yet such actions generate CSLI that the government can access with-
out a warrant.181 Cell phone users can hardly be expected to know what
location data their providers collect, as they are never shown any statement
showing that it is stored.182
In the Eleventh Circuit litigation, even the prosecutor, in his closing
argument, told the jury that “obviously” the defendants “probably had no
idea that by bringing their cell phones with them to these robberies, they
were allowing [their service provider] and now all of [the jurors] to follow
their movements on the days and at the times of the robberies.”183 It is truly
“fiction” that the vast majority of the American population, by choosing to
carry cell phones in a world that practically demands it, also consents to
warrantless government access to their location information.184
The government has often responded to these arguments by referencing
service contracts and the fact that they typically warn cell phone customers
that they collect location-relation information and may disclose such data to
law-enforcement agencies.185 Even disregarding the argument that a waiver
177. En Banc Brief of the Appellant Quartavious Davis at 30, Davis, 573 F.App’x 925
(11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2014) (No. 12-12928), 2014 WL 6526854 at *15.
178. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8
at 317–18 (“A cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a
cellular provider in any meaningful way.”); see also State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J.
2013) (stating the transmission of CSLI doesn’t involve a “voluntary disclosure in a typical
sense”).
179. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 317–18.
180. Id.
181. See section II-A discussing the technology behind CSLI.
182. See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, at 317–18 (“[I]t is unlikely that cell phone
customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location infor-
mation); see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 643 (“Although individuals may be generally aware that
their phones can be tracked, most people do not realize the extent of modern tracking capabili-
ties and reasonably do not expect law enforcement to convert their phones into precise, possi-
bly continuous tracking tools.”).
183. Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1217 (alteration in original).
184. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D. N.Y. 2011); see also Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d
504, 523 (Fla. 2014), reh’g denied (Dec. 8, 2014).
185. See Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11, at 613; see also In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 121
(concluding that any “expectation of privacy in cell-site-location records, if one exists, must be
anchored in something more permanent” than the “doubtful proposition” that cell phone users
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of rights should not be based on a massive service contract, the Court in
Smith addressed this argument when it stated that individuals cannot be
“conditioned” as to their Fourth Amendment rights.186 There may be circum-
stances in which the legal interest in protecting information from govern-
ment intrusion “trumps any actual belief that it will remain private.”187 As a
Federal Magistrate Judge in Texas noted, “the tech-savvy user may now un-
derstand that there is a risk that the provider can calculate and record his
location and movements very precisely” but the “bare possibility of disclo-
sure by a third party cannot by itself dispel all expectation of privacy.” Such
an articulation, the Judge noted, would mean that nothing would be left of
Katz, because in 1967 it was possible for a phone company to wiretap and
disclose a private conversation in a public phone booth, and that possibility
did not eliminate the phone booth user’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
that conversation.188
In the words of Justice Marshall, “it is idle to speak of assuming risks in
contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alterna-
tive.”189 People today are required to share information about themselves
with third parties on a daily basis merely to complete “mundane” tasks.190
Indeed, cell phones are “increasingly viewed as necessary to social interac-
tions as well as the conduct of business.”191 As Justice Sotomayor recog-
nized, Smith’s basic “premise that an individual has no reasonable
are currently “unaware of the capacities of cellular technology,” since “[p]ublic ignorance as to
the existence of cell-site-location records. . . cannot long be maintained”); En Banc Brief for
the United States of America at *24, United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.) va-
cated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928-UU), 2014 WL 7232613 at *13
(“Ignorance of undisputed and readily ascertainable facts is both ephemeral and undeserving of
constitutional protection.”).
186. See discussion around FN 100–101 for Smith statement that individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights cannot be conditioned by government intrusion.
187. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F.Supp.2d at 124.
188. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11 (“[I]t is possible that a carrier may open and
inspect a letter or sealed package, but that risk alone does not eliminate the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in such effects.”).
189. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs
that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.”).
191. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 859 (Mass. 2014); see ECPA (Part II):
Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 48
(2013) (testimony of Professor Matt Blaze) (“There is perhaps no more ubiquitous symbol of
our highly connected society than the cellular telephone. Over the course of only a few short
decades, mobile communication devices have evolved from being little more than an expen-
sive curiosity for the wealthy into a basic necessity for most Americans, transforming the way
we communicate with one another, do business, and obtain and manage the increasing volume
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expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”
is “ill-suited to the digital age” and should be reconsidered.192 Courts should,
“rather than simply characteriz[ing] the information as a third-party record
and consider[ing] the inquiry finished,”193 go a step further and analyze
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the much more
intrusive, personal information revealed in CSLI.
V. THE MOSAIC THEORY SWALLOWS THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The Third Circuit, ruling before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
United States v. Jones, incorporated two Supreme Court cases from the
1980s into its analysis, namely United States v. Knotts194 and United States
v. Karo.195 The Third Circuit read Knotts as establishing a public/private
distinction for understanding Fourth Amendment protections, and read the
two cases together as holding that privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment are “confined to the interior of the home.”196 The Third Circuit
failed to recognize that “outside-the-home” monitoring could also implicate
Fourth Amendment rights.197 The technological constraints of beeper sur-
veillance in Knotts and the limited amount of information that can be learned
about a person through beepers were critical to the Court’s holding.198 The
Knotts Court specifically reserved the question of whether a case involving
“twenty-four-hour surveillance” would require a warrant, stating “if such
dragnet-type law enforcement practices” should occur, “different constitu-
tional principles may be applicable.”199 This foreshadowed that a strict inside
the home/outside the home distinction would not be dispositive in all
contexts.200
of information that is available to us.”), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/ecpa2
.pdf.
192. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
193. See Freiwald, supra note 7, at 36–49 (criticizing the tendency of courts to rely on
analytic shortcuts like a “third-party” rule and a “content/non-contents” distinction rather than
analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy
194. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that people lack Fourth
Amendment protection of their location information when they are in public on “open roads”).
195. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that government monitoring
violated the Fourth Amendment because the beeper they used could determine whether a par-
ticular article or person was in an individual’s home at a particular time).
196. Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 8, 312–13.
197. Freiwald, supra note 5, at 685.
198. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, 281.
199. Id. at 281.
200. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that Karo and Knotts when
read together show that the location and potentially quantity of information obtained by the
Government are important to a Fourth Amendment analysis).
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The public/private distinction should be reconsidered in light of the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Maynard and the Supreme Court Jus-
tices’ concurrences in United States v. Jones, because these are written with
the sensitive nature of location information and the evolved technology of
cell phones in mind. Though both cases address GPS tracking, the evolution
of cell tower technology and the personal character of modern cell phones
make CSLI functionally equivalent to GPS data—if not more revealing.201
These cases establish what is referred to as the “mosaic theory” approach to
the Fourth Amendment. The mosaic theory requires courts to view govern-
ment conduct as a “collective whole rather than in isolated steps.”202 Rooted
in the concept of aggregation, it considers “whether a series of acts that are
not searches in isolation amount to a search when considered as a group.”203
The mosaic theory appears to provide a useful framework for consider-
ing CSLI, based on the amount of information collected by service providers
and the scope of government requests; however, this theory will not always
adequately protect cell phone users from government intrusion on their
Fourth Amendment rights. Even a single point of CSLI can intrude on a
legitimate expectation of privacy, and for that reason any line-drawing exer-
cise under a mosaic theory approach would be misguided.
A. Development of the Mosaic Theory
The Mosaic Theory originally took form in the D.C. Circuit’s decision
in United States v. Maynard, where the court found that the public/private
distinction in Knotts and Karo did not determine whether the use of pro-
longed GPS tracking data violates the Fourth Amendment.204 The Maynard
court rejected the government’s argument that the defendant had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his location information because he was driving
in public, explaining that “[t]he whole of one’s movements over the course
of a month. . . reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises”
and “[t]he difference is not one of degree but of kind.”205 The Maynard court
effectively rejected a limited reading of the Supreme Court’s 1980s prece-
dent, and embraced the notion that prolonged surveillance, even in a public
space, can violate legitimate expectations of privacy.
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the
Maynard decision, but the justices stated different reasons as to why. Justice
Scalia wrote for the majority, deciding the case based on a trespass theory of
the Fourth Amendment and thereby never addressing the reasoning in May-
201. See section II-A and II-D for discussion on the precision of cell site location data.
202. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
320 (2012).
203. Id.
204. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir.2010).
205. Id. at 561–62.
Spring 2015] No More Shortcuts 395
nard.206 Five justices, through concurring opinions, expressed that an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in location information with
respect to government monitoring over a prolonged period, suggesting they
embrace the mosaic theory approach to the Fourth Amendment.207 Justice
Alito, writing on behalf of three other justices, considered whether the en-
tirety of the monitoring over twenty-eight days exceeded societal expecta-
tions, and concluded that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”208
While Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, she wrote separately
to express that the use of the “unique attributes of GPS monitoring” consti-
tuted a search independent of its installation on the car, because “GPS moni-
toring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, pro-
fessional, religious, and sexual associations.”209 Justice Sotomayor stated
that she would consider these unique attributes when deciding whether peo-
ple reasonably expect that the sum of their public movements will be stored
and used by the Government to track their location.210 These concurring
opinions show five Supreme Court justices suggesting that prolonged gov-
ernment surveillance of an individual, even while they are in public, can
implicate Fourth Amendment concerns based on the amount of personal in-
formation such a collection of data could reveal.
B. The Mosaic Theory Fails to Adequately Protect CSLI
Several lower courts have embraced the mosaic theory and applied its
logic to historical CSLI, finding it must be protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement.211 The application of the mosaic theory to histori-
cal CSLI, however, presents a line drawing problem and would not
adequately protect an individual’s expectation of privacy. This is illustrated
in United States v. Skinner, where the Sixth Circuit held that three days’
worth of government monitoring of a defendant’s phone GPS data was the
type of “relatively short-term monitoring” which did not violate any reason-
206. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–54 (2012).
207. Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
211. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also In re Application of the
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (following
Maynard and denying warrantless requests for location data as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment) vacated, Fifth Circuit Opinion, supra note 11; In re Application of U.S. for an
Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581-85
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying the Maynard approach to location data obtained from cell phones),
reversed (Nov. 29, 2010).
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able expectation of privacy.212 The court failed to articulate why three days’
worth of monitoring did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and it made
things even less clear for lower courts by noting that situations may arise
where the government so comprehensively tracks an individual that “the
very comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.”213 Subsequently, a district court in Michigan found that
“when the government requests authorization to engage in long-term, real-
time tracking of an individual’s movements via his or her cell phone, the
situation reaches past the law set forth in Skinner, and Fourth Amendment
concerns are implicated.”214 These cases illustrate that Maynard and the
Jones concurrences do not draw a precise line between short-term and long-
term monitoring. They do offer some guidance, in showing that the surveil-
lance was “long-term” at some point before four weeks, but this leaves lower
courts hesitant to draw a precise line as to what constitutes unreasonable
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.
In the context of CSLI, such a line drawing exercise would be ineffec-
tive, because even one point of such information may invade a legitimate
expectation of privacy.215 One point of location data could reveal an individ-
ual in a private setting, such as in their home, or “near the home of a lover,
or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a house of ill re-
pute,” and there is no way to know ahead of time what the CSLI could
reveal.216 Therefore, it is necessary to require law enforcement agents to ob-
tain a warrant before gaining access to CSLI, because whether the request is
limited to a single data point or three months’ worth of data, it implicates the
same privacy concerns for Fourth Amendment purposes.
212. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
213. Id. at 780 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).
214. United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 776–77 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
215. See Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1216 (“cell site data is more like
communications data than it is like GPS information. That is, it is private in nature rather than
being public data that warrants privacy protection only when its collection creates a sufficient
mosaic to expose that which would otherwise be private.”); see also id., 943 F. Supp. at 775
(“If at any point a tracked cell phone signaled that it was inside a private residence (or other
location protected by the Fourth Amendment), the only other way for the government to have
obtained that information would be by entry into the protected area, which the government
could not do without a warrant.”)
216. See Eleventh Circuit Opinion, supra note 28, at 1216; see also In re Application of
the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2010) vacated, Fifth
Circuit Opinion, supra note 11 (“Like the thermal imaging devices in Kyllo, the cellular loca-
tion technology in use or development today crosses the firm but also bright Fourth Amend-
ment line that the Supreme Court has drawn at the entrance to the house.”) (internal quotation
omitted).
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VI. A JUDICIAL SOLUTION IS NEEDED TO PROTECT CELL PHONE USERS’
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CSLI
Ultimately, the only way to address CSLI is by conducting a normative
analysis. Courts should go further than the third-party doctrine or mosaic
theory in their Fourth Amendment analysis; they “should consider asking
not only whether cell phone users do in fact expect privacy in their location
data, but also whether they should.”217 In the words of Justice Sotomayor,
courts must ask whether the government intrusion “alter[s] the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.”218
The solution to this issue is for courts to require a warrant for all types
of CSLI. This data is analogous to tracking information and the sensitive
nature of such information requires Fourth Amendment protection. Allowing
the government to obtain such information without requiring a showing of
probable cause has led them to exploit this information and request extensive
amounts of data about innocent parties.219 A warrant requirement would not
only guard against such extensive requests,220 but it would also introduce
procedural safeguards such as “the need to provide notice to the target, after
the fact judicial review, and meaningful remedies,” all of which should make
a “significant difference.”221 The “intrusiveness of the method and its sus-
ceptibility to abuse” support the conclusion that a probable cause standard is
necessary to protect cell phone users’ Fourth Amendment rights.222
There is a recognized societal interest in ensuring “that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.”223 However, the desire to bring the guilty to
justice does not outweigh the desire to protect innocent individuals from
suffering intrusions on their Fourth Amendment rights. In the words of Sir
William Blackstone: “The law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer.”224 Adding a warrant requirement pro-
tects both interests, as it certainly does not make it impossible for the gov-
ernment to access such data, it simply requires them to show probable cause.
217. Fourth Amendment, supra note 91, at 1220–21.
218. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States
v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J. concurring)).
219. See section II-B discussing the nature of government requests.
220. Filling out the application for a warrant forces law enforcement agents to justify the
request to the courts and also to themselves. Writing an affidavit as part of the application for a
warrant requires the agent to make his request under oath, and as a practical matter, the time
and effort that would go into writing the affidavit for a warrant would limit the amount of
people for whom law enforcement agents could request their information. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(d).
221. See Freiwald, supra note 5, at 681, 749.
222. Id.
223. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
224. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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As the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he argument that a warrant requirement
would oblige the government to obtain warrants in a large number of cases is
hardly a compelling argument against the requirement.”225
As shown by the Jones concurrences, it is likely that at least five of the
Supreme Court Justices would be on board with a warrant requirement for
historical CSLI.226 Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, emphasized the sensitive nature of location information
and specially referred to cell phones as the most significant emerging tech-
nology shaping “the average person’s expectations about the privacy of his
or her daily movements” because of their ability to track and record cell
phone user’s physical locations.227 This suggests these four justices are wary
of the privacy implications of cell phone technology, and they would vote to
protect society’s legitimate expectation of privacy in CSLI. Justice
Sotomayor also emphasized that location information is sensitive informa-
tion that should be protected based on normative considerations, regardless
of “societal expectations.”228 She also stated that entrusting to the govern-
ment a surveillance technique that is “so amenable to misuse” is inappropri-
ate and should be subject to “oversight from a coordinate branch.”229 This
shows Justice Sotomayor would protect historical CSLI with a warrant re-
quirement based on the nature of the information. Even Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, showed he would follow the “reasonable expectation of
privacy test established in Katz” if he were to consider “[s]ituations involv-
ing merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass,” and sug-
gested such situations might be “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.”230
This suggests even more support on the Supreme Court for a finding that
Fourth Amendment protections apply to historical CSLI.
There is certainly room for Congress to resolve this issue; however,
courts cannot wait for a legislative solution to protect the millions of Ameri-
cans whose privacy interests are at stake.231 As Justice Alito recognized,
“[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solu-
tion to privacy concerns may be legislative” because “[a] legislative body is
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and
to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”232 However,
Justice Alito also stated that because “Congress and most States have not
225. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
226. See section III-B-i discussing Supreme Court support for a normative inquiry.
227. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962–63 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 953–54 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
231. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1701, 1734 (2004) (“Even with foresight, the law is bound to be lagging behind
technological developments, especially given the profound specificity and detail of the current
statutory regime.”).
232. Jones 132 S. Ct. at 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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enacted statutes” regulating the GPS technology at stake in Jones, “the best
that [courts] can do” is ask whether the government activity in a particular
case “involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated.”233
Congress can resolve this issue in one of two ways. First, they can estab-
lish that stored CSLI is considered tracking information. By clarifying that
this data is tracking information and not a wire communication, Congress
would take historical CSLI outside the scope of the SCA and make it subject
to the warrant requirement of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.234 Second, Congress can enact separate statutory protections for
CSLI. Congress has done this in the past in response to society’s privacy
concerns. For example, after Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 “to protect the customers of financial institutions from
unwarranted intrusion into their records while at the same time permitting
legitimate law enforcement activity.”235 The House Report explained that,
“while the Supreme Court found no constitutional right to privacy in finan-
cial records, it is clear that Congress may provide protection of individual
rights beyond that afforded in the Constitution.”236 The increasing number of
state and federal courts requiring a warrant to obtain CSLI, as well as actions
of numerous state legislatures to require the same, has certainly put pressure
on Congress to address the issue and resolve society’s privacy concerns.
Until that day comes, however, courts must be responsive to these concerns
and stop the government from abusing cell phone user’s constitutional
rights.
CONCLUSION
The protections of the Fourth Amendment “must keep pace with the
inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees will wither and
perish.”237 With CSLI, the government can “monitor and track our cell
phones, and thus ourselves, with minimal expenditure of funds and man-
power, [which] is just the type of ‘gradual and silent encroachment’ into the
very details of our lives that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.”238
In 1967, the Supreme Court held that a person’s phone conversation in a
phone booth was protected by the Fourth amendment, stating that “[t]o read
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication.”239 This principle cer-
233. Id.
234. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
235. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 9305 (1978).
236. Id. at 9306.
237. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010).
238. Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 523 (Fla. 2014), reh’g denied (Dec. 8, 2014) (quot-
ing Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 & n. 67 (D.D.C. 2013)).
239. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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tainly applies to cell phones today, and by denying Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to cell site location data, courts ignore the vital role that the cell
phone has come to play in the lives of over 335 million Americans.240
240. See Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, (June
2014), http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-
survey (As of December 2013, there were 335.65 million wireless subscriber accounts in the
United States, responsible for 2.62 trillion annual minutes of calls and 1.91 trillion annual text
messages.).
